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Abstract
Success in law enforcement of cartel cases hinges on solid investigation procedures and effec-
tive punishment. However, the existing legal framework provides guidance on computing 
fines based on sales revenue, even though it mentions such fines must be no lower than 
cartel gains. Using data from a real case in Brazil, this paper has two aims: (i) reviewing the 
difficulties associated with computing cartel overcharges and (ii) checking whether the fines 
levied on convicted firms are in line with these overcharges. We employ three methodologies 
to compute these overcharges. We find cartel overcharges estimates might be quite sensitive 
to its assumptions, but apart from differences in differences models with quadratic and cubic 
trends the fines are in the middle of the range of cartel overcharge estimates. This indicates that 
the fines are in line with cartel overcharges, but it is recommended to use a set of estimates 
produced by different methods to ensure their adequacy.
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Resumo
O sucesso na aplicação da lei de defesa da concorrência no que diz respeito à punição de cartéis 
depende de procedimentos sólidos de investigação e punição eficaz. No entanto, a legislação 
existente apenas fornece direção para o cálculo das multas de cartel com base na receita de 
vendas, ainda que tais multas não possam ser inferiores ao ganho de cartel. Usando dados de 
um caso real, temos dois objetivos no presente artigo: (i) revisar os desafios associados com 
o cálculo de estimativas de sobrepreço de cartel e (ii) investigar se as multas aplicadas à firma 
estavam de acordo com o valor do sobrepreço de cartel. Utilizamos três metodologias para 
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estimar estes sobrepreços. Os resultados indicam que as estimativas são sensíveis às hipóteses 
utilizadas, mas exceto por modelos diferenças em diferenças com tendências quadráticas ou 
cúbicas, as multas estão aproximadamente no ponto médio das estimativas. Isso indica que as 
multas estão em linha com os sobrepreços de cartel, mas se recomenda o uso de um conjunto 
de estimativas produzidas por diferentes métodos para se ter maior segurança de sua adequação.
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1. Introduction
One of the most important aspects of competition law enforcement is 
cartel prosecution. Success of this task is dependent on the investigation 
procedures and the effectiveness and strength of punishment when cartels 
are discovered.
This paper employs data from a real case,1 the hydrogen peroxide cartel, 
to address two questions. The first one is to review the pitfalls associa-
ted with estimating cartel overcharges in the context of a real case, i.e., 
carrying out the analyses in a way consistent with the time and data cons-
traints econometricians in competition offices face in a real setting that 
might make unfeasible more complex analysis suitable for an academic 
research project.2 The second question refers to how the overcharge esti-
mates compare with the actual fines levied in a specific case.
We study the the hydrogen peroxide cartel, in which two firms – Degussa3 
and Peróxidos do Brasil (PBR) – were convicted for conspiring to maintain 
high prices in the hydrogen peroxide market in Brazil. The conspiracy took 
1 The original documents from the case file are not publicly available. We were given access to them 
under a confidentiality agreement that prevents us from making the dataset available for replication. 
However, graphic display that illustrates the market behavior was allowed. We will be glad to share 
the original dataset as soon as the confidentiality is lifted.
2 For instance, estimation of damages based on models of dynamic games (Doraszelski & Pakes, 2007).
3 Degussa is the controlling firm of Bragussa, which is the actual producer of hydrogen peroxide. In 
2006, Degussa was acquired by RAG group, which later on was reorganized as Evonik Industries 
AG. Currently, the firm is denominated Evonik-Degussa in Germany, or simply Evonik in Brazil. To 
maintain consistency with the case file, we use the name Degussa throughout the paper.
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place between 1995 and 2004, when Degussa settled a leniency agree-
ment4 with CADE looking for reduced penalties. The whole prosecution 
took about 8 years and the firms involved were convicted in 2012. Using 
confidential data collected by CADE during the investigation, we estimate 
the value of overcharges imposed by the cartel and compare the estimates 
with the fines applied to the firms at the time of conviction. 
The economics literature (Landes 1983) indicates as the optimal punish-
ment for a price fixing case the sum of the monopoly transfer and the 
share of the deadweight loss borne by customers, provided enforcement is 
costless and all price fixing agreements are caught. Thus, comparing the 
fine levied by CADE and the losses from the cartel price overcharge is a 
“pragmatic” approach to assess the size of cartel fines. We consider this 
a “pragmatic” approach because there are economic issues (such as the 
evaluation of the deadweight loss size and the proportion of the overchar-
ge passed on to downstream consumers) which are not considered here 
and in themselves deserving a separate paper for each one.5 Thus, those 
overcharges can best be seen as a lower bound for fines. 
The estimates presented here can also help in terms of policy evaluation. 
The Brazilian competition law (12.529/11) sets fines for companies found 
guilty of participating in a price fixing conspiracy. They are liable to fines 
between 0.1% to 20% of gross sales revenue in the affected sector of either 
the firm or the group during the fiscal year prior to the beginning of in-
vestigations. However, the same law also states the fine must not be below 
the price fixing gains. Law 12.529 superseded Law 8.884/94, which was in 
force during the final ruling of this case, and had a somewhat similar text 
on the matter. This law stated firms convicted of price fixing conspiracies 
were liable to fines between 1% and 30% of net sales revenue, also provi-
ded this value was not below the gains from price fixing.
Apart from that caveat, all guidelines for computing cartel fines in such 
laws do not prescribe how these overcharges should be computed. Fines 
based on sales revenue have the advantage of being more transparent to 
all parties involved in a cartel case, not requiring any sort of assumption 
on how to measure actual economic profits from such course of action. 
However, such a loose relation between the fines levied and the gains from 
4 http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/leniency-program
5 Also, we do not dicuss the issue of the destination of fines levied, i.e., whether they should be re-
tuned to the affected parties as compensation or not.
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cartel activity lead us to question whether they could act as a deterrence 
to cartel activity. Thus, comparing the fines with the overcharges can also 
be helpful in checking whether an application of sales based fines is in line 
with the benefits from cartel activity to its members
The paper is structured in six sections. After this introduction, we revisit 
the definition of cartel damages, cartel overcharges and the literature on 
fines determination for cartels. The third section describes the hydrogen 
peroxide market in Brazil and the cartel prosecution that convicted the 
firms. The fourth section estimates cartel overprices caused by the cartel 
using three methodologies: a reduced-from, before and after and differen-
ce in differences approach, and a structural model. The fifth section com-
pares the estimated overprices to the total fines applied to the convicted 
firms and the sixth section concludes.
2. Cartel Damages, Overcharges and Fines
From a strictly legal standpoint, damages can be defined as “[a] pecuniary 
compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts by any 
person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to his person, 
property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of 
another” (Black 1991). This definition, by using terms as “compensation” 
for some “damage”, calls for a counterfactual analysis in the spirit that eco-
nomists are used to perform in other types of evaluation. A starting point 
for computing damages is by computing the estimated difference between 
the price consumers payed during cartel operation and a counterfactual 
price that would have been charged “but for” the cartel. Since we don’t 
observe this “but for” price, some sort of estimate is necessary and that is 
where economic analysis is fundamental.6
6 Even though this is a starting point, it is not an ending point. There several issues such as the ability 
of injured parties to pass on the price increases to ultimate consumers and the amount of lost sales 
due to increased prices.
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Our goal is then to estimate the counterfactual price, the one that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the cartel. We can use a standard price-
-quantity diagram to understand the role of this exercise and how it is 
applied in the calculation of different measures of cartel losses. Figure 
1 illustrates observed price and quantity set by the cartel, 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 and 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚 , 
and the price and quantity that would have prevailed under competition, 
𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 . From an economic point of view, the damages (welfare losses) 
caused by the conspiracy would be represented by area 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 . To get a 
financial value for this area one would need to provide some estimate of 
the demand function to find some estimate of the competitive quantity 
(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 ) and the competitive price (𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 ). However, time constraints found in 
legal cases could make it common to estimate only the competitive price 
and use observed quantities as a basis cartel losses. This approach leads to 
cartel losses depicted in the shaded area 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in Figure 1.7 
Figure 1 - Cartel Overcharges
Source: own elaboration
7 In technical terms, this represents the transfer of surplus from consumers to producers following 
the price elevation by the cartel. Area ABC, which completes the total damage, represents the loss 
in economic efficiency (dead-weight loss) related to units that are not sold due to the price increase.
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Algebraically this area is equal to:
 𝐴𝐴 = (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐) × 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚                                                                  (1)
          
In Equation 1, the term in parenthesis (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐) is denoted the “over-
charge”. Frequently, the overcharge can be expressed as a percentage over 
the observed price, (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐)/𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 , or in relation to the counterfactual 
price, (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐)/𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 (OXERA 2009). It is important to note that this mea-
sure understates the total welfare losses caused by a cartel in a market. 
First, it ignores the magnitudes of the deadweight loss represented by area 
ABC in Figure 1. Another important source of distortion occurs when 
the product in question is an intermediary and the price increase is then 
passed along the production chain until it reaches the final consumer. In 
those cases, if there is market power in the downstream chain, the losses 
can be amplified due to double marginalization.8
This fact leads to an important difference in terminology between the 
legal and economic communities in antitrust. Economists tend to define 
cartel damages as the total welfare loss caused from the cartel in action, 
whereas the legal definition above is much less clear about the other parts 
(downstream effects and deadweight loss) are part of the cartel losses. In 
the present paper, the focus will be on the overcharges themselves, and 
not on damages.
The empirical evidence on cartel effects shows that those can be signi-
ficant (Posner 2001; OECD 2002; Werden 2003; Levenstein & Suslow 
2004). The more comprehensive study available (Connor & Lande 2008) 
performs a meta-analysis of evidence raised in different fields of social 
sciences containing 674 observations of cartels documented between 1780 
and 2004, finding an average overcharge equivalent to 23% of the observed 
price.9 An extension of that study (OXERA 2009) adds 350 observations 
and applies some criteria to restrict the sample, resulted in a total of 114 
observations.10 The resulting distribution of overcharges relative to obser-
ved prices is shown in Figure 2.
8 As will become clear, this is the case in the hydrogen peroxide industry. However, we won’t address 
this issue in this paper.
9  Equivalent to 25% of the competitive price.
10 The selection criteria were: (i) cartels that started after 1960, (ii) cartels for which there was an es-
timate for the overcharge in the period when the cartel was active, (iii) studies where the method of 
damage estimation was clear enough and (iv) studies that were published in peer-reviewed academic 
articles or published book chapters.
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Figure 2 - Overcharges as a Percentage of Observed Prices
Source: (OXERA 2009).
In 93% of the cases, cartels succeeded in imposing overcharges to the 
market. The mean overcharge found was about 20%. International car-
tels had a mean overcharge greater than national cartels (26% vs. 16%). 
Cartels operating in the US and Canada had smaller overcharges than in 
other parts of the world (16% vs. 23%). Finally, illegal cartels had greater 
overcharges than legal ones (21% vs. 17%)
Specifically with respect to cartel punishment, the literature shows two 
main concerns in the calculation of fines: (i) prevention that other car-
tels are organized or stay in operation and (ii) compensation of victims 
(Connor & Lande 2008). Each jurisdiction finds a different equilibrium 
between these two goals. It is important to notice the setting of fines is a 
separate task from computing overcharges, even though a value for cartel 
overcharges can be helpful in fine setting.
The current Brazilian law (12.529/13) limited fines to 20% of sales in the 
year before the beginning of prosecution, adding that it should not be less 
than de advantage obtained from the cartel when this is possible to esti-
mate. Besides, executives in charge of the cartel can be fined from 1% to 
20% of the fines received by the firm. Other sanctions can be considered 
by CADE, such as: prohibition of parceling of fiscal debts, prohibition of 
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contracting subsidized funds from state banks and prohibition of partici-
pating in public procurement processes. Finally, executives are also subject 
to criminal lawsuits that can result in convictions from 2 to 5 years in 
prison.11 The Brazilian jurisdiction also allows for the possibility of private 
recurring to courts for restitution of losses caused by cartel action.
At the time of this writing, the definition of cartel fines is a controversial 
subject in the Brazilian Antitrust Authority. In case 08012.002568/2005-
51, on a price fixing conspiracy in the market for natural gas in the state 
of Pará, northern Brazil, the commissioner assigned to the case proposed 
a fine based on an econometric study which she claimed was well within 
the bounds of applicable case law. In this case, she was seconded by only 
one other commissioner. Three other commissioners have filed dissenting 
opinions presenting estimates based only on percentages of net sales with 
different market definitions – and with lower fines.
Both sides in this controversy have good points, which give even more re-
levance to an empirical study as the present one. On a first glance, cartel 
fines based on a percentage of sales in a single year might be seen as lea-
ding to too small fines. However, since the percentage of these sales that 
actually accrue to the firm owners might be quite small, a large percentage 
of sales might be equal to the additional net profits from several years of 
a price fixing conspiracy. Besides, a rule based on net sales instead of net 
profits might be robust to different accounting standards on how net pro-
fits are computed. This gives predictability to the enforcement of the Law.
On the other hand, basing fines in a study specifically designed to mea-
sure price fixing gains also have benefits. First of all, it gives an estimate 
directly related to the infringement, which might give the right incentives 
in discouraging cartel activity. Besides, an estimate of cartel overcharges 
made by the Competition Authority could help increase the number of 
cases brought to courts by individuals and firms harmed by cartel activity, 
fulfilling the role of Competition Advocacy the Brazilian Competition 
Authority has. Fines based on losses inflicted are also common in other 
areas in Brazil. For instance, Law 13.506/17, which sets the framework 
for fines by the Brazilian capital markets regulator, stipulates fines can be 
based on twice the losses caused by the defendant.
11 Similar provisions were also in the previous Brazilian Competition Law (8.884/94).
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In any case, some light must be shed on whether sales based fines as in 
Law 12.529/13 are close to measures of cartel overcharges, which makes 
the present study specially relevant. We aim by doing so at looking at a 
specific case, to be discussed below.
3. The Hydrogen Peroxide Cartel
Hydrogen peroxide is mainly used as a bleaching agent in the pulp and 
paper industry, with other applications including chemical processes, 
treatment of industrial and residential effluents, and textile industry.12 
Information from the case file reveals the main clients of one of the cartel 
firms are in the pulp and paper industry (56%), chemical (8%) and textiles 
(8%). Even though there are other bleaching agents, hydrogen peroxide has 
some advantages, such as: lower cost, better whitening quality, reduction 
of effluents colors and lower environmental impact. On the production 
side, the main inputs used are hydrogen – produced from naphtha – na-
tural gas, electricity, oxygen – produced by compression of atmospheric 
air – anthraquinone and solvents.
The Brazilian market has the same large international players, Solvay (who-
se Brazilian subsidiary is Peróxidos do Brasil or PBR) being the largest one 
with total capacity of more than a million tons/year, more than twice the 
second largest player, Evonik-Degussa. In Brazil, the industry started in 
1974 when PBR installed its first production plant. Since 1997, its acti-
vities are concentrated in Curitiba/PR. Until the 90’s, PBR was the sole 
producer and virtual monopolist in Brazil. From 1992 on, when Degussa 
started to consistently sell in the Brazilian market through imports,13 the 
industry evolved as a duopoly, with market shares stabilizing at 60% to 
PBR and 40% for Degussa. Only in 2011 a new player came to scene when 
the Turkish group Garipoglu inaugurated its production plant, Peroxy 
Bahia, in Camaçari/BA, with capacity of 40,000 tons/year. By 2012 the 
shares in capacity, as available in the company s´ websites, were: 62% for 
PBR, 24% for Degussa and 14% for Peroxy Bahia.
12 Most of the information in this section was gathered from the case file. We try to keep information 
from the specific firms as unidentified as possible.
13 In 1992, Degussa built a system of tanks in Brazil that allowed it to receive and store large amounts 
of hydrogen peroxide and build a portfolio of local clients.
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Although imports can be potential competitors, they face high costs and 
risks associated with large distance transportation. Besides, regular supply 
involves installing specific storage equipment at the customer facilities,14 
which gives an additional competitive advantage to local producers. 
Imports were greater or about the same as exports in 1997 and 1998, 
when Degussa was starting its activities in Brazil through imports. Since 
installed capacity is larger than total domestic demand, firms have incen-
tives to export as way to explore economies of scale in production.15
The combination of product and market characteristics shape the compe-
titive strategies followed by market participants. Very briefly, the compe-
titive environment in the hydrogen peroxide industry can be summarized 
in the following points:
1. Hydrogen peroxide is a homogeneous product, with no substitutes, 
with price being the main strategic variable;
2. Transportation costs and operational risks require installation of 
dedicated equipment at client premises, making physical proximity 
from clients a big advantage;
3. As a reflection of 2, long-term supply contracts are common practi-
ce, making it difficult for a new entrant to gain market share;
4. Demand is concentrated in the pulp and paper industry;
5. Large dispersion in production capacities (40,000 to 180,000 tons/
year).
By the end of January 2004, Degussa’s executives started negotiating 
a leniency agreement with competition officials at the Secretariat of 
Economic Defense from the Ministry of Justice (SDE/MJ). They sought 
to obtain lower fines and reduced legal sanctions as a result from collabo-
rating with the investigation. With its executives negotiating an agreement 
with the Brazilian Competition Authority, Degussa stopped responding to 
PBR requests for meetings in Brazil after February, 2004.
14 It is not by chance that production units currently in operation in Brazil are located close to pulp and 
paper plants in the states of Paraná, Espírito Santo and Bahia.
15 Also, there are only two other production plants in South America in Argentina and Venezuela that 
are smaller than the Brazilian counterparts.
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The leniency agreement was celebrated in May 2004 between Degussa, 
its executives and competition authorities and public attorneys in char-
ge of criminal investigation. In that agreement, the executives presented 
internal documents that proved the existence and operation of the cartel 
and elaborated a document titled “History of Infringements” with detailed 
information on meetings and procedures for the cartel functioning.
The investigation started right after the agreement and, in June 2004, 
a dawn raid operation was set at the companies’ headquarters to collect 
additional information and evidence of conspiracy. The lawsuit began in 
September 2004 and investigations lasted until 2012, when PBR and its 
executives were convicted by the Brazilian Competition Authority, under 
the terms of Law 8.884/94. They set a fine at 30% of Brazilian net sales 
for the last year prior to Degussa leniency agreement, corrected by the 
interest rate of short term Brazilian government debt. The calculation of 
the fines applied to PBR is detailed in Table 1.
Table 1 - Calculation of Fines
Sales in 2003 R$ 187.737.809,87
Discount 1 – Returns and Allowances R$ 11.144.679,83
Discount 2 - PIS/COFINS R$ 16.866.067,76
Net sales in 2003 R$ 159.727.062,28
Updating factor 2,0269870000
Updated net sales R$ 323.764.678,79
Percentage of fine 30%
Final value of fine R$ 97.129.403,64
PBR executives were also personally liable for additional fines, according to 
Law 8.884/94. In the next section, we will present several methodologies 
to assess cartel overprices to compare with this amount.
4. Estimating Cartel Overcharges
We estimate cartel overcharges, as defined in section 2, using three 
approaches: a reduced form “before/after” analysis, a reduced form “dif-
ference in differences” and a structural model. The methods are based on 
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econometric techniques, which set them apart from techniques based on 
accounting data only, for instance. However, they rest on very different 
behavioral assumptions. Both “differences in differences” and “before/
after” are agnostic about the competitive environment that would have 
prevailed without the cartel, whereas the structural model requires an 
explicit assumption on what would be the model that reflects the com-
petitive behavior of firms without the cartel (Bertrand, Cournot, etc.).
Those differences also reflect in the data requirements for each method. 
Structural models require information on prices, quantities sold and data 
on demand and cost shifters. The other approaches require information on 
prices, as well as assumptions on markets and time periods when the cartel 
was active or not. The choice among these alternatives is highly context 
specific and could not be ranked in terms of suitability without knowing 
the availability and quality of data in a given case. Initially we will discuss 
our dataset, assembled as a combination of information from case files and 
publicly available information.
4.1.   Dataset
Data on hydrogen peroxide market in Brazil were gathered from the case 
file that contained detailed information regarding revenues, prices and 
volume of sales between July 1997 and May 2004, a total of 83 months. 
From the information in the previous section, it is likely that the cartel 
end would be reflected in market variables at some point between January 
2004 and May 2004.
After manually scraping the PDF case files, we were able to construct four 
time series of average prices for PBR: “ex-works”16 domestic price, delivery 
domestic price, export “ex-works” price and export delivery price. The in-
formation on PDF case files was originally collected in a dawn raid in PBR 
offices, which indicates that, even with a legal authorization for searching, 
all relevant data might not be available.
Information of prices and revenues were in nominal terms and were defla-
ted with the Brazilian wholesale price index (IPA-IBGE). Figure 3 shows 
the evolution of the four series, which have missing observations and the 
16  Price at the plant gate.
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most complete one refers to the domestic delivery price, which has missing 
observations for the period June-December of 2003. Yet, it is possible to 
note that domestic prices are systematic larger than the corresponding 
export prices.
Figure 3 - PBR Prices
Source: case file.
We would like to use ex-works prices to estimate the overcharge, since 
this is net of transport costs, but the domestic ex-works price series has 
47 (56%) of missing observations. Nevertheless, ex-works and delivery 
prices are highly correlated: in the 29 months that have information for 
both prices we find a correlation of 0.95. Hence, we opted to fill the mis-
sing points using a linear projection from delivery prices17 and a quadratic 
trend.18 Figure 4 shows the resulting series used for estimation.19
17 The delivery price series also has 6 months of missing observations that were filled using a similar 
procedure and a forecast for revenues in 2002 and 2003. All results are available upon request.
18 Model estimates are available upon request.
19 We use the observed domestic ex-works prices, with missing observations replaced by the estimated 
price.
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Figure 4 - Ex-Works Prices (observed vs. estimated)
Source: case file
Besides prices and quantity data, we also gathered series of public avai-
lable variables that can represent demand and cost shifters. For demand 
shifters, we used the index of industrial production for pulp and paper. 
For cost shifters we used the price of naphtha, average electricity price for 
industries, and industry real wages.
International prices for Napthta in the spot market of north-western 
Europe are expressed in USD and are available at the INSEE websi-
te,20 and average electricity prices are from the National Electric Energy 
Agency and were available at the IPEADATA website. Real wages data 
for industry are from Foundation for Economic Resarch (FIPE) and are 
available for the São Paulo region.
We also used information on hydrogen peroxide markets in South America 
and the USA, as counterfactual markets in the difference in difference 
models. 21 For South America, price series were assembled from statistics 
on quantity and value of exports available in from the AliceWeb system 
20  https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001641576?idbank=001641576 
21 Details on why those markets were chosen are given below.
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of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade. The original sales 
data are in nominal dollars and were converted to Brazilian Reais and 
then deflated using the IPA-IBGE index. For demand shifters we used 
information for quarterly GDP. For the US market, hydrogen peroxide 
average monthly prices were taken from Bloomberg (US cents/pound). 
Wage data come from the BLS and refer to average earnings for workers 
in the chemical industry (NAICS 3251). Data on electricity costs were 
obtained from the US Energy Information Administration and on naphtha 
international prices from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic 
Studies. All values were converted to Brazilian Reais and deflated using 
the IPA-IBGE. From this dataset our econometric analyses were carried 
out. The first one is a reduced form analysis which practitioners call “be-
fore and after analysis”.
4.2.  Before and After Analisys
The reduced form approach (Baker & Rubinfeld 1999) estimates an equa-
tion that relates prices to demand and supply shifters and dummy variables 
that capture changes in the behavior of market participants. This approa-
ch is based on the notion that the estimated equation is a result of some 
structural model for demand and supply relations that determine market 
equilibrium. Changes in the behavioral equations (e.g. as a result of the 
end of a cartel) are reflected as changes in the coefficients of the estima-
ted equations that are captured by dummy variables.
One way to estimate cartel overcharges uses the affected market, or the 
firms participating in the cartel, and compare the evolution of prices du-
ring cartel operation with periods of “normal” competition, i.e., when the 
cartel is not operating. This approach is also known as “before vs. during 
vs. after” analysis. The econometric model we use to implement the analy-
sis is represented by Equation 02. It uses time series data to estimate a 
relationship between market price (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ), cost and demand shifters (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 ) and 
a dummy variable (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 ) that is equal to one in time periods of cartel and 
0 otherwise. The coefficient 𝛿𝛿 represents the cartel overcharge, i.e., the 
difference between the cartel price and the competitive price.
 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡                                                            (2)
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The inclusion of additional explanatory variables controls for other market 
influences that might have affected prices simultaneously to the conduct, 
like cost or demand shocks that can cause price increases that would be 
erroneously attributed to the cartel.
The advantage of this analysis is that it uses the same units (firms or 
markets) that were affected by the cartel to estimate the counterfactual 
price. Hence, the counterfactual is not contaminated by systematic and 
unobservable differences across markets that might confound a cross-sec-
tional comparison of markets/firms affected and not affected by the cartel.
A big challenge concerns the determination of the period when the cartel 
operated (beginning and end) as well as the baseline period of normal 
competition over which to make the comparison. The analysis can be done 
comparing time periods before the cartel starts and after the cartel is 
implemented or time periods when the cartel is active and after its brea-
kdown. Each of these choices has merits and drawbacks. The first case 
(before/during) has the advantage of using as a baseline a period when 
conduct is not contaminated by the cartel that, probably, reflects better 
a non-cooperative pricing by the firms. On the other hand, it can be dif-
ficult to identify the exact moment when the cartel started operating: 
firms can adhere gradually over time and different regions and additional 
firms might gradually adhere as well. The second case (during/after) has 
the advantage of being more recent, which facilitates data collection. On 
the other hand, in periods after dismantling, it’s possible that the market 
takes some time until it reaches a non-cooperative equilibrium, since firms 
might still know a lot of information about their rivals (OXERA 2009) or 
they might have incentives to keep elevated prices to strategically mask 
evaluation of cartel overprices conducted in investigation (Harrington, Jr. 
2004).
Our analysis uses the post-cartel phase, which we assume starts in January 
2004, as the competitive period, as opposed to the cartel period that we 
assume lasted until December 2003. This choice rests on information in 
the case file that shows that the last meeting between executives from 
Degussa and PBR took place in that month for a performance review of 
the year of 2003 and in that same month, Degussa started negotiations for 
the leniency agreement. Another practical reason for that choice is that 
the information in the dataset starts in 1997, when the cartel was alrea-
dy operating. Figure 5 shows the evolution of price and displays a sharp 
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drop in January 2004 that is maintained in the following months, which 
we consider as additional indication that the cartel ceased operating right 
after the negotiations of the leniency agreement started. Hence, variable 
of interest takes the value of 1 for time periods without the cartel and 
zero for time periods when the cartel was operating (before January of 
2004). Therefore, we expect to find a negative estimate for the coefficient 
of interest (𝛿𝛿 ) in equation 2, that captures the price drop after the end of 
the cartel. Table 2 shows results from our most preferred specifications 
for Equation 2.22
Table 2 - Overcharge Estimates (TS): Depend Variable: PBR Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2004/01 -136.319*** -162.232*** -156.207***
[32.444] [19.087] [19.113]
2004/02 -88.891 -114.526* -105.817*
[45.164] [43.970] [46.054]
Constant 749.323* 1108.925** 4076.147*** 4319.399*** 9758.565 12983.111
[281.801] [372.856] [545.235] [609.372] [6256.586] [6913.980]
N 65 65 65 65 65 65
r2 0.710 0.635 0.873 0.785 0.876 0.793
Linear Trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quadratic Trend no no yes yes yes yes
Cubic Trend no no no no yes yes
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Linear models with trends (linear, quadratic and cubic) and month seasonal dummies. Controls: real 
wages, pulp and paper production, 
Sample: 1999/01-2004/05
For the sake of comparison, we use two different dates for the end of the 
cartel: January and February of 2004. For demand and cost shifters we use 
the index of industrial production for pulp and paper, the price of naphtha, 
average electricity price for industries, and industry real wages. We also 
include different specifications of deterministic trends (linear, quadratic 
and cubic) to capture possible non-linarites in the behavior of prices.
The estimated coefficients show a significant decrease in prices in January 
of 2004 between R$136.3/ton and R$162.2/ton. Setting the date of the 
cartel end in February reduces the effect and makes it non-significant.23 
22 The complete results are available upon request.
23 We also tested for cartel ends in 2004/03 and 2004/04 with insignificant results. As robustness 
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Relative to the average price of R$753.62/ton before the cartel end, this 
represents a decrease between 18% and 22%. Hence, the magnitude of 
the overcharge is also of economic significance. Applying the estimated 
overcharges to the observed quantities between 1998 and 2004, we find 
an average of R$ 174.65 million for the implied cartel  overcharge (Eq. 01).
4.3.  Difference in Differences
The difference in difference model (Angrist & Pischke 2009) expands the 
reduced form analysis by using longitudinal data on different markets in 
time periods with and without cartel operation. Concretely, the model 
compares the evolution of prices in markets affected vis a vis in markets 
not affected by the cartel. Therefore, we use the non-affected market as 
a counterfactual for what would have been the evolution of prices in the 
affected market, had it not been affected by the cartel. The econometric 
model that implements the difference in difference methodology has the 
following general form:
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                    (3)
In Equation 3, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  represents observed price in market i at time period t, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  
a market fixed effect and 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 a fixed effect for the period when the cartel 
was active. 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for markets and time 
periods when the cartel is in operation and the coefficient 𝛿𝛿 is the over-
charge (price difference) caused by the cartel. The variable 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents 
cost and demand shifters that also affect observed prices in each market. 
The central assumption that allows us to identify the parameter  𝛿𝛿 as the 
causal effect of interest is that prices follow the same trend in the absen-
ce of the change in conduct. This change induces a deviation from the 
common trend in one of the markets that can be attributed to the cartel. 
Other differences in prices across markets that are due to non-observed 
factors that are fixed over time are captured by the market fixed effects.
Besides the time period when the cartel is active, the difference in difference 
method requires the definition of the non-affected markets that are used as 
check, we tested for cartel end before January 2004, between July and December of 2003, with 
insignificant results. All those additional tests can be made available upon request.
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counterfactuals. Our analysis uses the markets in South America – except 
Brazil – and the USA. The evidence in the case files points that the cartel 
operated in the Brazilian territory, which motivated the definition of the 
relevant market as Brazil only. This evidence, coupled with geographical and 
economic proximity of countries makes South America as a good candidate 
for counterfactual market. The choice of the US market is justified by two 
reasons. First, the use of an additional counterfactual allows checking for the 
robustness of estimates as it brings more information to the analysis. Second, 
a similar cartel operating in the US market was uncovered and punished in 
2001, years before the Brazilian cartel. Hence, it’s plausible to assume that, 
from 2002 onwards, the US market behaved in non-cooperative competitive 
conditions.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of hydrogen peroxide prices for the three 
markets chosen for the analysis. The sharp drop in prices in the Brazilian 
market in January 2004, while the other prices follow a smooth trajectory, 
allows us to identify the effect of the end of the cartel and the overcharge 
that was caused by the conduct.
Figure 5 - Hydrogen Peroxide Prices
Sources: case file (BR), Bloomberg (USA) and AliceWeb (SA).
Before the computation of cartel overcharges, we conduct some tests to 
check on the assumption of the difference in difference model: prices 
follow similar trends in all markets and the counterfactual markets are 
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not affected by the end of the conduct.24 Visual inspection of Figure 7 
suggests that prices in Brazil follow an upward trend while in the other 
markets it follows a downward one. Statistical analysis confirms that. We 
control for those differences by adding market specific trends, in different 
specifications (linear, quadratic and cubic), to the estimated model. We 
also check if there is any change in the behavior of prices in the coun-
terfactual markets, after controlling for demand and cost shifters, after 
January 2004.25 We find that South America and US markets do not 
respond consistently to the variable that indicates the end of the cartel. 
In the first market, prices respond positively. In the US, the sign of the 
variable is not constant across different specifications. Hence, we conclude 
that South America and US can be valid choices for counterfactuals for 
the Brazilian market.
Table 3 shows results for Equation 3. The variable “cartel” corresponds to 
an interaction between a dummy for Brazil and a dummy for January 2004 
onwards.26 The models were estimated for each counterfactual market 
separately and using all together.
Table 3 - Overcharge Estimates. Dependent Variable: Price
Model Counterfactual Cartel S.E. Trend N r2
(1) SA -75.178*** [12.806] lin. 58 0.986
(2) SA -148.329*** [20.088] lin. ¹ 58 0.99
(3) SA -280.023*** [25.357] quad. ¹ 58 0.995
(4) SA -207.064*** [23.358] cub. ¹ 58 0.996
(5) USA -59.855*** [12.144] lin. 58 0.992
(6) USA -140.110*** [18.248] lin. ¹ 58 0.995
(7) USA -242.083*** [18.642] quad. ¹ 58 0.998
(8) USA -195.923*** [21.698] cub. ¹ 58 0.998
(9) SA/USA -67.516* [6.837] lin. 87 0.989
(10) SA/USA -144.220*** [3.713] lin. ¹ 87 0.993
(11) SA/USA -261.053** [17.476] quad. ¹ 87 0.996
(12) SA/USA -201.493*** [5.236] cub. ¹ 87 0.997
1: market specific trend
Models (1)-(8): Robust standard errors in brackets.
Models (9)-(12): standard errors clustered at the market level.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Sample: 1999/01-2004/05
24 We do not report the results for these pre-analysis due to space constraints but they are available 
upon request.
25 Results are available upon request.
26 The complete results, including controls and robustness checks are available upon request.
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The results show some variation on estimates of overcharge across specifi-
cations. For each counterfactual analysis (Brazil vs. SA, Brazil vs. US and 
all together), we estimate a model with a deterministic linear trend and 
a linear, quadratic and cubic market specific trends. Hence, for each cou-
nterfactual market we have four different specifications. All coefficients 
are significant and have the expected sign. The inclusion of market spe-
cific trends increases severely the magnitudes, indicating that controlling 
for different trends is quite important. Nevertheless, those estimates are 
closer to the ones obtained using the time series methodology of the last 
section.
The average overcharge estimate is R$168.57/ton with a range between 
R$59.86/ton (Brazil vs. US) and R$280.02/ton (Brazil vs. South America). 
Relative to the average price of R$753.62/ton before the cartel end, this 
represents a decrease between 8% and 37%. The South America market 
produces bigger estimates for the overcharge (average R$177.65/ton27) 
compared to the US market (average R$159.49/ton).28. Applying the esti-
mated overcharges to the observed quantities between 1998 and 2004, we 
find an average of R$ 231.21 million for the implied overcharge (Eq. 01).
4.4.  Structural Model
The structural approach makes intensive use of oligopoly models to es-
timate directly the equations (supply and demand sides of the market) 
that determine industry equilibrium. The estimated equations are then 
used to simulate an alternative (counterfactual) market price that would 
have prevailed according to some specified non-cooperative (e.g. Cournot, 
Bertrand) equilibrium (OXERA 2009). The main advantage of this approa-
ch is that we do not need data for both periods of normal competition 
and of cartel behavior, and another market to serve as the counterfactual 
competitive benchmark. Also, the structural approach allows the resear-
cher to estimate the complete welfare cost (area 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in Figure 1) 
of the conspiracy. The main drawback of this approach is related to the 
need to specify a specific form of competition in the absence of the car-
tel. Alternative specifications can result in very different results and the 
27 Using a model with quarterly data that includes GDP, real wages and price of naphtha as controls, 
the average is R$150,80/ton.
28 Using a model that includes real wages, electricity prices and naphtha as controls, the average is 
R$160.74/ton.
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choice requires very strong justification from the researcher. Such issues 
were already discussed in the literature, for instance in (Crooke, Froeb, 
Tschantz, & Werden 1999) for the case of merger simulation or (Genesove 
& Mullin 1998) for a specific application. 
Estimation begins by choosing a specific specification for a system of 
equations that describe the demand side and a supply relation for the supply 
side. For the demand side, we use the following linear specification:
 𝑄𝑄 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑌𝑌                                                                     (4)
In Equation 4, 𝑄𝑄 represents quantity of hydrogen peroxide, 𝑃𝑃 is price and 
𝑌𝑌 a demand shifter.
For the supply side, an important issue is the specification for the industry 
average marginal cost. We use the following linear function:
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑊𝑊           (5)
In Equation 5, 𝑊𝑊 represents input costs. Hence we’re assuming a constant 
marginal cost with respect to the quantity produced that implies that 
average costs are decreasing relative to the quantity produced. This is 
consistent with a fixed coefficients (Leontief) technology – which seems 
reasonable provided production of hydrogen peroxide depends on a chemi-
cal reaction. Besides, information from the case file indicates fixed costs 
accounts for about 1/3 of total production costs.29 We experimented with 
richer specifications with not much success.
Equilibrium is characterized from the profit maximization problem of a 
firm in an imperfectly competitive industry. As such, the firm equates 
perceived marginal revenue to marginal costs to determine the quantity 
produced. Since . 𝑄𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  , and firm’s i revenue is given by . 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑄𝑄)𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 , 
marginal revenue is given by the following equation:
                                     
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃 + 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
 
29 According to information contained in the case file.
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Multiplying the above expression by firm i’s market share (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ) and sum-
ming over all firms we find an expression for “market wide” marginal 
revenue:
 . ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃 + 𝑄𝑄
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖
                                                              (6) 
       
Summation in the left hand side of Equation 6 can be written as .. ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
2 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆
𝐴𝐴 
and represents the “aggregate” conjectural variation and characterizes indus-
try conduct. So, for instance, if industry behaves as a Cournot oligopoly, then 
.. 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 1 and 𝜆𝜆𝐴𝐴 equals the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentra-
tion (which in our case is equal to 0.5, with both firms sharing equally the 
market). If the industry is perfectly competitive, 𝜆𝜆𝐴𝐴 = 0, and if it behaves as 
a monopoly (or a perfect cartel),𝜆𝜆𝐴𝐴 = 1.
Using the linear demand to obtain a functional form for Equation 5, equating 
Equations 4 and 5, such that marginal cost equals perceived marginal reve-
nue, and rearranging, we arrive at the following supply relation:
 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑄𝑄
𝜆𝜆𝐴𝐴
𝛽𝛽1
+ 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑊𝑊                                                                (7)
Equation 7 can be jointly estimated with Equation 4 and the parameter 
𝜆𝜆𝐴𝐴 can be recovered by dividing the coefficient on 𝑄𝑄 in Equation 6 by 
the inverse of the coefficient on 𝑄𝑄 in Equation 4. We implement this 
model using the quantity of hydrogen peroxide sold in Brazil for time 
period t, the hydrogen peroxide price per ton, the industrial index for 
cardboard production as a demand shifter (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ) and labor cost, both 
contemporaneously as well as one period lagged as input price (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 ) in the 
marginal cost equation. The estimation method used was Three-Stage 
Least Squares.30 Table 4 shows the results of joint estimation of Equations 
3 (demand) and 6 (supply). The estimated models reject the hypothesis of 
perfectly competitive and Cournot behavior (in which the conduct para-
meter would be equal to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with both firms 
sharing equally the market).
30 For the demand equation, we have a first stage F statistic of 82.49, but not as large as the F stage for 
the supply relation, which was 1.91.
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Table 4 - Structural Estimation Results
System Equations
Demand Supply
Price -1,5217***
(-4,2227)
Cardboard 33,8037*
(2,4257)
Wages -94,0909***
(-5,1859)
Quantity 1,0213***
(3,6009)
Constant 4,2e+03*** 4,3e+03***
(3,9265) (6,0783)
Observations 50
                                      λ                        1,5542
Competition (p-value) 0,0029
Cartel
(p-value)
0,2890
Cournot
(p-value)
0,0437
On the other hand, we do not reject the hypothesis of cartel behavior. 
The overcharge is obtained by substituting an alternative value for 𝜆𝜆𝐴𝐴 that 
is compatible with Cournot oligopoly: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
of concentration. With this procedure, we find overcharge of about 9.3%. 
Applying the monthly overcharge to the observed quantities between 1998 
and 2004, we find a figure of R$ 27.88 million for the estimated  overprice 
(eq. 01).
5. Fines and Estimated Overcharges
After estimating cartel overcharges (eq. 01), we compare the results ob-
tained with the fine effectively imposed to PBR. An important question 
is how to arrive at a specific value for cartel overcharges when faced with 
several estimates computed using different methods that cannot be a prio-
ri ranked in terms of adequacy. This issue frequently arises in court cases, 
when experts from both sides present estimates from different methods 
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grounded on specific assumptions on modelling strategies (e.g. structural 
or reduced form) or model specifications (OXERA 2009). The economics 
literature identifies two solutions to this question. The first one would 
be selecting the “best” model – i.e. the best combination of modelling 
approach and data – and the second one would be combining all estimates 
into a single value.
Selecting the “best” model (e.g. structural vs. reduced form) seems like a 
good principle but has the drawback of having to find a good criterion for 
ranking such disparate modelling strategies. Both rely on more or less res-
trictive assumptions which cannot be conclusively accepted or rejected a 
priori in general or for this case in particular. To our knowledge, the litera-
ture on empirical industrial organization has not arrived to a conclusion on 
this issue in recent debates (Angrist & Pischke, 2010; Nevo & Whinston, 
2010). On the other hand, the “pooling of estimates” approach is common 
in the empirical economics literature, especially with respect to forecas-
ting models (Hendry & Clements, 2004). These authors point out that: 
(i) combining individual forecasts of the same event often outperform the 
individual forecasts and (ii) simple rules for combining forecasts, such as 
averages, often outperform more complex rules.
More specifically with respect to estimating cartel losses, (OXERA 2009) 
also notices both approaches, choosing a “best” model or using some sort 
of “pooling” approach. When there’s some reason that a specific metho-
dology is superior to all others, the authors support the usage of a single 
set of values.
The advantages of a “pooling” approach set forth in (OXERA 2009) are 
more in line with the present study, as the following quotes indicate:
“When the models rely on different sub-sets of avai-
lable data, combining the forecasts means that the 
final value reflects more of the underlying data (and 
hence more of the available information) than a single 
model alone.[…] Even when care is taken during the 
model estimation, there may be biases in the indivi-
dual models due to the particular assumptions and 
model structure employed. Pooling the results is likely 
to help reduce these, as positive and negative biases 
tend to cancel one another out, at least to some ex-
tent” (OXERA 2009)
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The authors also caution against a simple average of all models, suggesting 
instead that removing approaches and estimates with weaknesses – a prac-
tice they call as “trimming”. Considering these points, we used averages 
of our estimates as our baseline estimate for overcharges. In the following 
Table 5, we present the estimated overcharges and the additional revenue 
due from cartel action, considering the quantity actually sold throughout 
the period between 1998 and 2004.
We need two additional adjustments to make the comparison between the 
overcharge multiplied by sales and the fines levied by firms. The first one 
involves the different time periods used in our calculations and the one 
used by CADE. While we use the period between 1998 and 2004, the 
competition authority considered the period between 1995 and 2004. So, 
we made a proportional adjustment of the estimated values since we do 
not have information on quantities sold before 1998. The second adjust-
ment concerns adjusting the values for the period between the leniency 
agreement to the conviction date. We used the same factor (based on 
SELIC money market rate) applied by the authorities as described in the 
case file31 to express money figures in BRL at the time of final ruling, 
May 9th, 2012. These adjustments give the “Adjusted Estimate” figures 
in Table 5.
Finally, we also make one adjustment to the fines applied by CADE. Since 
Degussa was exempted from fines because of the leniency agreement with 
CADE, we estimated what would have been the total fines applied if 
Degussa had not been exempted by dividing the fine applied to PBR by its 
market share as defined by the cartel: 60%. This gives the “Adjusted Fine” 
figure on Table 5 and figure 6. Table 5 brings together the adjusted cartel 
overprices (panel A) and the estimated total values and fine applied (panel 
B). Figure 6 gives a visual comparison of the figures obtained.
31  The factor, 2.026987, was computed from the SELIC rate available at the Receita Federal do Brasil 
(Brazil’s tax authority) website and is the rate required by law 9021/1995 for adjusting values of the 
fines. We chose to report all values for the same date as of the final ruling (May 9th 2012) to highlight 
the differences in values exclusively from different methodologies and assumptions and not hypoth-
eses on adjusting values for inflation.
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Table 5 - Overcharge, Total Fine, and Overcharge multiplied by sales
Method Notes
Overcharge 
(R$/ton)
Overprice X Sales 
(million)
Adjusted Overprice X Sales 
(million)
Structural 68.67 27.88 94.19
TS1
First Degree Polynomial 
Trend + Cartel Ending Jan 
2004
136.32 55.35 186.98
TS2
First Degree Polynomial 
Trend + Cartel Ending Feb 
2004
88.89 36.09 121.92
TS3
Second Degree Polynomi-
al Trend + Cartel  Ending 
Jan 2004
162.23 65.87 222.52
TS4
Second Degree Polynomi-
al Trend + Cartel  Ending 
Feb 2004
114.53 46.50 157.09
TS5
Third Degree Polynomial 
Trend + Cartel Ending Jan 
2004
156.21 63.42 214.26
TS6
Third Degree Polynomial 
Trend + Cartel Ending Feb 
2004
105.80 42.96 145.12
DD1 (BR vs. SA) Linear Trend 75.18 30.52 103.12
DD2 (BR vs. SA) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Linear Trends 148.33 60.22 203.45
DD3 (BR vs. SA) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Quad. Trends 280.02 113.69 384.08
DD4 (BR vs. SA) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Cubic Trends 207.06 84.07 284.01
DD5 (BR vs. USA) Linear Trend 59.86 24.30 82.10
DD6 (BR vs. USA) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Linear Trends 140.11 56.89 192.18
DD7 (BR vs. USA) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Quad. Trends 242.08 98.29 332.05
DD8 (BR vs. USA) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Cubic Trends 195.92 79.55 268.73
DD9(All) Linear Trend 67.52 27.41 92.61
DD10 (All) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Linear Trends 144.22 58.55 197.81
DD11 (All) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Quad. Trends 261.05 105.99 358.07
DD12 (All) Linear Trend+Mkt. Spec Cubic Trends 201.49 81.81 276.37
Average 150.29 61.02 206.14
Fine 97.13
Adjusted fine 161.88
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Figure 6 - Fine and Overcharges (R$ millions)
Source: case file and own calculations.
It is clear from Table 5 and Figure 6 that there is a large discrepancy 
between the values estimated by different methods, which indicates the 
important role played by different assumptions on the resulting estimates. 
The range of estimates starts at a minimum of R$ 82.1 million to a maxi-
mum of R$ 384.08 million: a 368% difference. A striking example of this 
point is shown by the reduced form estimates found using the time series 
and the difference in difference methods. Table 6 presents estimates of 
the mean overcharge for the before and after and for the differences in 
difference estimates (pooling all estimates and trimming the non-linear 
trends). One can notice the standard deviation reduces by almost half.
Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics of Overprice estimates
Method Mean Maximum Minimum SD Range
Time Series  R$  174.65  R$  222.52  R$  121.92  R$   39.93  R$  100.60 
Diff-in-Diff  R$  231.21  R$  384.08  R$   82.10  R$  103.19  R$  301.99 
Diff-in-Diff (2)  R$  145.21  R$  203.45  R$   82.10  R$   58.12  R$  121.35 
Diff-in-Diff (2): Descriptive Statistics from estimates with linear trend and linear market specific trends, 
trimming DD3, DD4, DD7 and DD8.
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Such a large dispersion in cartel overcharge and damage estimates indica-
tes caution in applying any single set of estimates as a basis for computing 
cartel fines. The results point out that, as a practical matter, it would be 
advisable to have several estimates arrived at by different methods to act 
as guideline for setting fines. These estimates could also be used as a star-
ting point for litigants aiming at starting cases in Brazilian Civil Courts for 
redress of losses caused by this price fixing conspiracy.
As for the second research question, the adjusted fine of R$ 161.9 million 
is approximately in the middle of the range of estimates for the Time 
Series (Before and After) and somewhat above the middle of the range of 
estimates for the Diff-in-Diff approach, trimming the polynomial market 
specific trends. This indicates one cannot say the level of fines is out of 
line with cartel overcharges, even though cartel overcharges are only a 
part of total cartel damages. Deadweight losses and losses from passing 
the price increase to consumers downstream are not considered in these 
estimates. At least in this specific case, the setting of fines based on sales 
revenue does not seem to lead to excessively low fines. The most one can 
say on this matter, considering the estimates presented, is that the level of 
fines might not be enough to implement the optimal deterrence strategy 
(Landes 1983).
6. Conclusion
This paper has two goals. The first one is to use real case data from a car-
tel conviction case, the hydrogen peroxide cartel, to highlight the pitfalls 
associated in estimating cartel overcharges under time and data resource 
constraints similar to those faced by completion officials in real cases. The 
second one is to compare the fines levied on the convicted firm with the 
cartel overcharges during the cartel period, since the existing law only 
provides guidance for computing cartel fines based on sales revenue, and 
not on the actual cartel overcharges.
We applied three different methods to data produced during the investi-
gation phase: a reduced form, before and after and difference in differen-
ce, model and a structural model of supply and demand for imperfectly 
competitive markets. The results of all models show large dispersion, 
Estud. Econ., São Paulo, vol.49 n.3, p. 569-599, jul.-set. 2019
598                                                      Renato Nunes de Lima Seixas e Claudio Ribeiro de Lucinda 
reflecting the effects that different modelling assumptions and strategies 
have on these estimates. Such a large dispersion in estimates indicates the 
need of caution in applying any single one of them as a basis for compu-
ting cartel fines. The results point out that, as a practical matter, it would 
be advisable to have several estimates arrived at by different methods to 
act as guideline for setting fines. These estimates could also be used as a 
starting point for litigants aiming at starting cases in Brazilian Civil Courts 
for redress of losses caused by this price fixing conspiracy.
As for the second research question, the adjusted fine of R$ 161.9 million 
is approximately in the middle of the range of estimates for the Time 
Series (Before and After) and somewhat above the middle of the range of 
estimates for the difference in differences approach, trimming the polyno-
mial market specific trends. This indicates one cannot say the level of fines 
is out of line with cartel overcharges, even though cartel overcharges are 
only a part of total cartel damages. This does not imply the cartel fine is 
optimal in any sense defined by the literature, because deterrence aspects 
should also be factored in the final number.
As a policy recommendation in such a controversial issue, our results point 
to a pluralistic approach. When calculating estimates of cartel overchar-
ges, the safest course seems to employ several techniques, ideally starting 
from different assumptions. A set of estimates could reduce the effect of 
assumptions made in the implementation of one individual methodology. 
Besides, the results should be compared with fines computed as a per-
centage of sales. Since Law 12.529 and its predecessor (Law 8.884) both 
allowed some leeway in determining the inputs for which sales figures 
were to be computed, having an alternative estimate of cartel overcharges 
could help with that also.
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